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FIRST AMENDMENT-PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND THE RIGHT TO
ADVERTISE
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
The absolute ban on lawyer advertisements
enforced by the bar since the beginning of this
century was held unconstitutional in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona.2 The five-four decision
extended limited first amendment protection
to the "commercial speech" of two Arizona
attorneys. Although commercial advertise-
ments-like libels, 3 obscenities 4 and fighting
words'-were once considered totally unde-
serving of first amendment protection,6 recent
Supreme Court decisions have recognized limi-
ted first amendment protection of advertising.'
Bates reinforced the modern position of com-
mercial advertising along the first amendment
spectrum somewhere between protected and
unprotected speech. However, the Court indi-
cated that the "limited" first amendment guar-
antee is a bit more limited than previous com-
mercial speech cases had suggested. The ma-
jority Justices found that the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine would not be available in
a commercial context.8 Thus, while noncom-
mercial speakers may secure the invalidation
of speech regulations merely by showing that
those regulations could be applied unconstitu-
tionally in a hypothetical case, an advertiser
1 63 A.B.A.J. 1126 (1977).
2 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
' Libel -traditionally considerd to be outside the
first amendment realm-may have been brought
"within" the area of constitutionally protected speech
by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
'Gertz recognized constitutional limitations on private
individuals' ability to recover for defamation. See,
e.g., N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLIT-
ICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 524
(1976).
1 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
'See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
6 See, e.g., Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
1 See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975),
and Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumers'
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
s 97 S. Ct. at 2707. The Court had previously
allowed an advertiser access to the overbreadth doc-
trine in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975).
However, the Bates Court did not distinguish or
discuss the Bigelow ruling on overbreadth.
must show that the regulation he is challenging
was applied unconstitutionally to him.
In explicitly confining its decision to protect
the "restrained"9 and truthful 0 newspaper ad-
vertisement of fees for various routine legal
services, 1 the Supreme Court suggested that,
in another context, the first amendment might
permit regulation of special advertising prob-
lems not presented in the case at bar-includ-
ing problems of advertisements broadcast over
electronic media; 12 representations of service
quality; 13 in-person solicitation;14 false, decep-
9 The Court twice indicated that its opinion re-
ferred to "restrained" advertising. 97 S. Ct. at 2703,
2705.
10 See, e.g., id. at 2709.
11 Id.
12 Id. Following the Bates decision, the American
Bar Association House of Delegates approved a revi-
sion of the Code of Professional Responsibility to
provide for certain limited types of attorney adver-
tisements. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, revised Ethical Consideration 2-8,
Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B), (D) [subsequent citations
are to Ethical Considerations, EC, or to Disciplinary
Rules, DR] Although television was not among the
media which the Code listed as acceptable for attor-
ney advertisements, Disciplinary Rule 2-101(C) au-
thorizes an attorney to seek special bar permission to
advertise on other media and to advertise informa-
tion not specifically permitted by the Code. Under
the revised provisions, attorney advertisements gen-
erally "should be motivated by a desire to educate
the public to an awareness of legal needs and to
provide information relevant to the selection of the
most appropriate counsel rather than to obtain pub-
licity for particular lawyers." EC 2-2. Advertisements
are also to convey their information in a "dignified"
manner, DR 2-101(B), although one could argue that
an individual attorney's unconventional style or flam-
boyancy would be among the factors relevant to a
potential client's selection of appropriate counsel.
s According to the Court, representations of the
quality of legal services "probably are not susceptible
to precise measurement or verification and, under
some circumstances, might well be deceptive or nis-
leading to the public, or even false." 97 S. Ct. at
2700. The revised ABA Code, in an advisory Ethical
Consideration, disapproves of representations of
quality. EC 2-9.
14 97 S. Ct. at 2700. The revised ABA Code contin-
ues to prohibit person-to-person solicitation of
clients, except for close friends, relatives, former
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tive or misleading information;15 time, manner
and place of advertising;16 or other activity
which "might well pose dangers of overreach-
ing and misrepresentation not encountered in
newspaper announcement advertising."
17
The Bates decision also considered whether
the ban on lawyer advertising constituted an
illegal restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. The Court held that the federal
antitrust statute did not apply to the Arizona
Bar regulation, which amounted to sovereign
activity of the state. 8
The Arizona Supreme Court Decision
Bates, along with his law partner, O'Steen,
opened a "legal clinic" in Phoenix and sought
to provide a high-volume, moderately-priced
array of routine 9 legal services primarily for
moderate income persons who did not quite
qualify for government aid. "To attract
clients,' 20 Bates and O'Steen placed an adver-
tisement in the Arizona Republic, a daily Phoe-
nix-area newspaper, stating that their "legal
clinic" was offering services at "very reasonable
fees," and listing fees for uncontested divorce
or legal separation, uncontested adoption, non-
business bankruptcy and change of name."
The attorneys conceded that their advertise-
ment was clearly in violation of the Arizona
State Bar Association's Disciplinary Rule
against attorney advertising, which was con-
tained in the state Supreme Court rules enacted
by the Arizona legislature. 22 The rule pro-
vided, in part:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his part-
ner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm, as a lawyer through news-
paper or magazine advertisements, radio or tel-
clients (where advice given is germane to the former
employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably
believes to be a client. See, e.g., EC 2-3, 2-4; DR 2-
103(A), 2-104(A)(1).
15 97 S. Ct. at 2708. See also EC 2-9; DR 2-101(A).
16 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
17 Id. at 2700.
18 Id. at 2696 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943)).
19 Services considered "routine" included uncon-
tested divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple per-




evision announcements, display advertisements
in the city or telephone directories or other
means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so on his be-
half."
Following a complaint and hearing, a Special
Local Administrative Committee recom-
mended that Bates and O'Steen be suspended
from the practice of law for not less than six
months each. 24 Later, the Board of Governors
recommended that the punishment be reduced
to a one-week suspension for each. 2 Upon
review in the Arizona Supreme Court, a plural-
ity reduced the penalty to censure and upheld
the advertising ban against challenges based on
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 6 the first amend-
ment, the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment and claims of vagueness.'
The Arizona court first dismissed the anti-
trust claim, concluding that (1) the state prohi-
bition against advertisements by attorneys was
unlike classic illegal "price-fixing"; and (2) even
if price-fixing would have been apparent, the
ban on advertising would have been exempt
from the federal anti-trust statute because it
was established by the state, acting as
sovereign .28
In holding that the first amendment would
not protect the lawyers' advertisement against
state restraint, the Arizona court emphasized
the difference between restrictions on profes-
sional activity and those on other forms of
commercial activity. "Restrictions on profes-
sional activity, and in particular advertising,
have repeatedly survived constitutional chal-
lenge,' '1 9 the court said, explaining that such
IDR 2-101(B); Aruz. Sup. CT. R. 29(a).
24 97 S. Ct. at 2695.
2Id.
26 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1970).
21 In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
2Id. at. 642-43. The Arizona Court distinguished
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1973),
where the United States Supreme Court held that a
county bar association's fee schedule effectively estab-
lished an artificially high price floor for various legal
services and thus constituted classic price-fixing viola-
tive of the Sherman Act. The Arizona court also
cited Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where
the Supreme Court held the federal antitrust statute
inapplicable to sovereign activities of the state.
29 555 P.2d at 643. The Arizona court cites deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court based on
fourteenth amendment challenges to professional
regulation: Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
1977]
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forms of "solicitation" have been deemed "con-
trary to the best interest of society."3 Further,
the Arizona court distinguished legal services
from prepackaged drugs, advertisements of
which were held to be constitutionally protected
against restraint by the pharmacy profession in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc.31 In Virginia Phar-
macy, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that even professional advertising could claim
first amendment protection in some situations.
But the Court explicitly limited its holding to
the case before it. 32 That limitation was empha-
sized by the Arizona court:
[Q]uite different factors would govern were
we faced with a law regulating or even prohibit-
ing advertising by the traditional learned profes-
sions of medicine or law.
The interest of the States in regulating lawyers
is especially great since lawyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of adminis-
teringjustice....
Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not
dispense standardized products; they render
professional services of almost infinite variety and
nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility
for confusion and deception if they were to
undertake certain kinds of advertising.'
The Arizona court, in upholding the bar's
ban on advertising, nonetheless reduced the
penalties of Bates and O'Steen from one-week
suspension to censure because the court con-
cluded that the attorneys had acted in good
faith in testing the constitutionality of the
rule.3 4 Bates and O'Steen appealed.
The United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court first dis-
posed of the antitrust claim. It unanimously
agreed with the Arizona court that the adver-
tisement ban was not the kind of illegal restraint
of trade prohibited by the Sherman Act since
483 (1955); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442
(1954); Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
30 555 P.2d at 643.
3- 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
31 Id. at 773 n.25.
33 555 P.2d at 644-45 (citing 425 U.S. at 774
(Burger, C. J., concurring)). The distinction was also
suggested by the majority in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
31 555 P.2d at 646.
the bar regulation amounted to state sovereign
action .3  The Justices followed Parker v.
Brown,36 where the Court had found "nothing
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature.
s3 7
Bates distinguished the facts at bar from those
present in two post-Parker decisions, where
"state action" was interpreted narrowly to find
the anticompetitive activities to be "private ac-
tion" not shielded from Sherman Act sanctions.
First, Bates considered the quantum of state
involvement in a voluntary county bar associa-
tion's fee schedule, held to be illegal price-
fixing in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.3 8 In
Goldfarb, the state bar and the state supreme
court indicated their intent to enforce the mini-
mum fee schedule by enforcement of an ethical
rule against solicitation. 39 In Bates, however,
the Supreme Court found that the Arizona
Bar's ban on attorney advertising was estab-
lished by the affirmative command of the state
supreme court.40 The Court also distinguished
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 41 where an electric
utility regulated by a state commission was
found to use its monopoly power illegally to
restrain competition in the sale of lightbulbs.
Cantor was said to involve actions of a utility-
"a private party"42-whereas, the Justices in
Bates reasoned, the Arizona Supreme Court
was the real party in interest in the case at bar.
Further, the Bates Court stated that "regulation
of the activities of the bar is at the core of the
State's power to protect the public," whereas in
Cantor the state possessed no "independent
regulatory interest in the market for light
bulbs."
43
35 97 S. Ct. at 2698.
36 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
3
1 Id. at 350-51. Parker upheld a California legisla-
tive restraint on competition in the raisin-growing
industry, the apparent goal of which was to maintain
raisin prices and avoid "demoralization" of the indus-
try. The Court there found that the program was
not aimed at commerce and did not discriminate
against commerce, "although it undoubtedly affected
the commerce by increasing the interstate price of
raisins and curtailing interstate shipments." Id. at
367.
38 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
39 Id. at 777.
40 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
41 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
42 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
43 Id. at 2697-98.
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Regarding the first amendment question, a
divided Supreme Court invalidated the Arizona
Supreme Court holding and ruled that the
absolute ban on attorney advertisements vio-
lated whatever free speech protection is en-
joyed by such advertisements.44 The Court
stressed that only a limited amount of first
amendment protection was at issue, since the
Bates-O'Steen advertisement did not present
questions of false, deceptive or misleading in-
formation, unverifiable claims of service qual-
ity, or in-person-solicitation .45 The Court noted
that first amendment protection had been ac-
corded paid advertisements in other contexts-
including the commercial advertisements of
pharmacists who "did not wish to report any
particularly newsworthy fact or to comment on
any cultural, philosophical, or political
subject,' 46 and the political advertisements of
candidates for public office 47 and defamers of
public officials.
48
In recognizing a first amendment interest in
such advertisement, the Bates Court located at
least part of that interest in the listener-as
opposed to the speaker-when it wrote:
The listener's interest is substantial; the con-
sumer's concern for the free flow of commercial
speech often may be far keener than his concern
for urgent political dialogue.... And commer-
cial speech serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of products and
services, and thus performs an indispensable
role in the allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system.... In short, such speech
serves individual and societal interests in assur-
ing informed and reliable decisionmaking.
49
Indeed, the Court considered the listener's first
amendment interest sufficiently compelling to
warrant a presumption that commercial infor-
mation "is not in itself harmful, [and] that
people will perceive their own best interests if
only they are well enough informed." 50 The
44 Id. at 2709. Four Justices dissented on the first
amendment issue: Mr. Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Powell, Stewart and Rehnquist.
45 Id. at 2700.
46 Id. at 2698 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
425 U.S. at 761 (1976)).
47 97 S. Ct. at 2698 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976)).
48 97 S. Ct. at 2698 (citing New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
49 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
50 Id. (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770).
Court said that in the face of a "paternalistic"
effort to withhold information from the public
for its own good, "[t]he choice between the
dangers of suppressing information and the
dangers arising from its free flow was seen as
precisely the choice 'that the First Amendment
makes for us."'51
Against these first amendment considera-
tions, the Court analyzed and refuted six
avowed state interests in perpetuating the ab-
solute ban on attorney advertisements:
(1) The Adverse Effect on Professionalism. The
Court found that the traditional distaste for
attorney advertisements was rooted in old Eng-
lish etiquette, which forbade such advertise-
ments on the theory that lawyers were public
servants and "above" trade.52 Finding this an
anachronism, the Court said that the "real-life
fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the
bar" should not be concealed from themselves
or their clients.5" No persuasive connection was
found between limited advertising and the hy-
pothetical erosion of true professionalism-
particularly since the bar's Code of Ethics re-
quired that the basis of attorneys' fees be dis-
cussed with clients at the commencement of
the relationship.5 Further, the Court said that
lawyers' failure to advertise could be associated
with their failure to reach out to the commu-
nity.
55
(2) The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney
Advertising. The Court gave three reasons why
restrained professional advertisements would
not necessarily mislead the public. First, the
Court found that legal services are not so
individualized as to preclude informed com-
parison on the basis of information contained
in ads.56 On this point, the Justices reminded
the Arizona bar that standardized rates had
been used in its own Legal Services Program,
and that minimum fee schedules for standard-
ized legal tasks had been utilized by private
attorneys prior to Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar.5 7 The Court reasoned that in any case,
51 Id. (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 770).51 d. at 2702-03.
5Id. at 2701-03.
54 Id. at 2701 (citing EC 2-19, as effective prior to
revision in August, 1977).
MId. at 2702.
56 Id. at 2703.
57 Id. (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773




"[t]he only services that lend themselves to
advertising are the routine ones. ' ' 58 Second,
the Justices found that a potential client can
ordinarily identify for himself the general type
of legal service he wants.-9 And third, the
Court acknowledged that advertising would not
provide a complete basis for selection of an
attorney, but found that "the preferred remedy
is more disclosure, rather than less. If the
naivete of the public will cause advertising by
attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's
role to assure that the populace is sufficiently
informed as to enable it to place advertising in
its proper perspective. ' 60 Without advertising,
the Court said, information as to the qualifica-
tions or reputations of lawyers is not available
to many, and if available, it may be inaccurate
or biased.
61
(3) The Adverse Effect on the Administration of
Justice. The Court agreed with the state bar
that some additional litigation might be "stirred
up" by attorney advertisements. However, the
Court found that prospect a welcome one for
the not-quite-poor whom the legal system in-
adequately served-partly because those indi-
viduals may know relatively little about how to
choose a suitable attorney, and partly because
they may fear the costs of litigation .
62
(4) The Undesirable Economic Effects of Advertis-
ing. The Court rejected the Arizona bar's claims
that advertising would increase attorney over-
head, ultimately driving up legal fees, and that
new attorneys who could not afford expensive
ad campaigns would be handicapped against
established attorneys. 63 The Court found that,
although the effect of advertising on the price
of services is not yet certain, retail product prices
are often dramatically lower than they would
be without advertising.6 Further, the Court
reasoned that in the absence of advertising an
attorney who is seeking clients must rely upon
contacts developed over time and therefore,
58 97 S. Ct. at 2703. "[A]dvertising is a more signifi-
cant force in the marketing of inexpensive and fre-
quently used goods and services with mass markets,
than in the marketing of unique products or
services." Id. at 2703 n.25. The Court did not, how-
ever, consider whether the rare advertisement for a
unique legal service would be inherently misleading.
59 97 S. Ct. at 2704.6
1 Id. at 2704 n.30.
61 Id.
6 1 Id. at 2705.
6 Id. at 2705-06.
64 Id. at 2706. See also note 58 supra.
advertisements could actually facilitate the new
attorney's market penetration.6"
(5) The Adverse Effect of Advertising on the
Quality of Service. Essentially, the Arizona bar
argued that the existence of advertised stan-
dard packages would encourage attorneys to
use those packages, regardless of how well they
fit a client's needs. Again, the Court reminded
the bar that its own prepaid Legal Services
Program had provided standard packages of
services and concluded: "Restraints on advertis-
ing ... are an ineffective way of deterring
shoddy work.
66
(6) Problems of Enforcement. The Arizona bar
finally warned that a vigilant regulatory mech-
anism would be required to monitor attorney
advertisements for falsity or deception, since
adequate enforcement could not depend upon
complaints by unsophisticated consumer-vic-
tims who might not realize that they were
duped. The Court rather casually disposed of
that problem by reassuring the bar: "For every
attorney who overreaches through advertising,
there will be thousands of others who will be
candid and honest and straightforward . 6 7 The
Court did not, however, cite its authority for
the one-to-"thousands" ratio.
Having disposed of the state's six justifica-
tions for the general ban on attorney advertise-
ments, the Court could do little else but extend
at least some free speech protection to such
ads.68 However, the Court explicitly limited the
extent of free speech protection to be enjoyed
by commercial advertisers, noting the "'com-
mon-sense differences' between commercial
speech and other varieties."69 Basically, the
6Id. at 2706.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2707. The inadequacy of bar policing
machinery was discussed in the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart.
Noting that there are approximately 400,000 lawyers
in this country, he wrote: "In view of the sheer size
of the profession, the existence of a multiplicity of
jurisdictions and the problems inherent in the main-
tenance of ethical standards even of a profession
with established traditions, the problem of discipli-
nary enforcement in this country has proven to be
extremely difficult." Id. at 2715.
The ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems & Recominen-
dations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970) found
that disciplinary action is virtually nonexistent in
many jurisdictions.
8 97 S. Ct. at 2708.69Id. at 2707-08.
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Court reasoned that full first amendment pro-
tection is less essential in a commercial context
because "advertising is linked to commercial
well-being," 70 its truthfulness "presumably" can
be determined in advance of publication, 71 and
the danger of chilling such speech is therefore
less compelling.
The Court's opinion reflected two significant
limitations on the first amendment's protection
of commercial speakers. First, Bates found that
the overbreadth doctrine would not be available
in the context of professional commercial ad-
vertising, and might not even apply "in the
ordinary commercial context. ' 72 Second, the
Court said that the limited free speech protec-
tion would not preclude some regulation of
advertising.
3
The first amendment overbreadth doctrine
represents a departure from traditional rules
which generally preclude a person, to whom a
statute may be constitutionally applied, from
challenging that statute on the ground that it
could possibly be applied in an unconstitutional
manner to others. 74 Generally, constitutional
rights are personal and may not be asserted
vicariously, since "under our constitutional sys-
temr courts are not roving commissions assigned
to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's
laws." 75 However, an exception to this policy is
made where "weighty countervailing policies"
are at stake.7 6 Thus, where free expression is
concerned, the danger of discouraging pro-
tected speech is so great that the Courts' over-
breadth doctrine will permit invalidation of an
overly-broad speech restraint without proof
that the restraint was unconstitutionally ap-
plied. The only necessary proof is that the
restraint could have been unconstitutionally
applied to someone. "Litigants, therefore, are
permitted to challenge a statute not because
their own rights of free expression are violated,
but because of a judicial prediction or assump-
70 Id. at 2707.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2708-09.
74 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973). There, the Supreme Court reviewed the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine and refused to
apply it to the expressive conduct, as opposed to
"pure speech" of civil servants who alleged that an
Oklahoma statute prohibited their protected as well
as unprotected political activity.
75 413 U.S. at 610-11.
76 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1960).
tion that the statute's very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expres-
sion."77
Bates reasoned that the overbreadth doctrine
is required where "the possible harm to society
from allowing unprotected speech to go un-
punished is outweighed by the possibility that
protected speech will be muted."78 However,
the Court concluded that there was little danger
of chilling commercial speech because "com-
monsense" indicated that such speech is linked
to commercial well-being and lends itself to
prior determinations of whether the informa-
tion was truthful and protected. 79 Thus, the
Court concluded that "the justification for the
application of the overbreadth analysis applies
weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial
context."8 0
Bates proceeded to describe the "clearly per-
missible limitations" of commercial advertis-
ing."' The Court said that advertising's limited
first amendment right did not preclude regu-
lation of false, deceptive, or misleading adver-
tisements; representations of quality or service;
in-person solicitation; mandatory consumer
warnings or disclaimers; time, manner and
place of advertising; and special problems of
advertisements broadcast over the electronic
media.
8 2
However, the Court rejected the claim that
77 413 U.S. at 612.
78 97 S. Ct. at 2707.
79 Id.80 Id. The Bates Court did not distinguish or even
discuss its prior application of the overbreadth doc-
trine in a commercial context. For instance, in Bige-
low v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), a newspaper
editor who had published an ad containing abortion
information was allowed to use the overbreadth doc-
trine to challenge a state statute making it a misde-
meanor to encourage procurement of an abortion by
sale or circulation of any publication. The Bigelow
Court concluded that it was error to deny the appel-
lant standing "where 'pure speech' rather than con-
duct was involved, without any consideration of
whether the alleged overbreadth was or was not
substantial." Id. at 817. However, the Bigelow Court
invited a distinction based on the nature of the
speaker: "The strength of appellant's interest was
augmented by the fact that the statute was applied
against him as publisher and editor of a newspaper,
not against the advertiser or a referral agency or
practitioner. The prosecution thus incurred more
serious First Amendment overtones." Id. at 828.




the Bates-O'Steen advertisement was mislead-
ing and therefore suppressible. 83 The Justices
concluded that the ad's use of the term "legal
clinic" was not vague or misleading, since the
term would be readily understood by the public
to refer to an operation, like the one adver-
tised, which generally provided standardized
serviices. Further, the Court did not find decep-
tion in the ad's claim that "very reasonable"
prices would be charged; the Court accepted
that representation as fair in light of customary
charges by other law firms, even though the
Arizona bar had argued that the prices were
not a "bargain." And finally, the Court held
that it was not deceptive to announce a fee for
a name change without stating that the change
could be accomplished without the aid of an
attorney .
84
Thus, the Court concluded that attorney
advertisements could not constitutionally be
subject to blanket suppression, and that what-
ever regulation might be permissible in another
context, Bates and O'Steen's nondeceptive
newspaper advertisement of fees for routine
legal services was protected by the first amend-
ment.85
The Effect of the Bates Decision
In reinforcing the notion that commercial
speech is worthy of at least some first amend-
ment protection, Bates further undermined two
early Supreme Court decisions which appeared
to place commercial speech totally outside the
scope of protected expression. Valentine v.
Christensen8 6 introduced the exclusionary com-
mercial speech doctrine in 1942 with the simple
assertion that "the constitution imposes no ...
restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising."8 7 Valentine did not cite
precedent or principles to support its conclu-
sion. Nor did the Court limit its broad declara-
tion to permit governmental restraint on com-
mercial advertising where the manner of its
dissemination was objectionable, although such
a qualification might have been asserted based
on the facts of the case. In Valentine, the Court
upheld the validity of an ordinance banning
the distribution of handbill advertisements on
a public thoroughfare. The handbill distributer
83 Id. at 2708.
84Id.
85 Id. at 2708-09.
86 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
8 1 Id. at 54.
apparently sought to circumvent the ordinance
by adding a public interest message on the
reverse side of his advertisement. The Court
indicated that the first amendment might not
tolerate a similar restraint on the distribution
of noncommercial handbills; but the Court said
that once advertising was added, the constitu-
tional protection disappeared.
Nine years later, the first amendment was
interpreted so as not to protect door-to-door
magazine sellers against an ordinance forbid-
ding such solicitation. In Breard v. City of Alex-
andria,"" the Court suggested that the "element
of the commercial" removed first amendment
protection from the sellers' efforts to dissemi-
nate their publications. It was that commercial
element which the Court emphasized in distin-
guishing the facts at hand from those in Miartin
v. Struthers,8 9 where Jehovah's Witnesses were
granted a first amendment right to sell religious
pamphlets door-to-door for twenty-five cents.
Breard, also, could have been narrowly con-
structed so as to sanction regulation of advertis-
ing when the manner of its dissemination is
intrusive .o
Valentine and Breard have never been explic-
itly overruled; indeed, Valentine was cited as
recently as 1973 for the proposition that the
first amendment did not protect advertise-
ments furthering illegal commercial activity. In
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commis-
sion,a' the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from
segregating want ads on the basis of sex, since
employment discrimination on the basis of sex
was illegal.
Recently, however, the Court has admitted
the "doubtful validity"' 2 of the early exclusion-
ary commercial speech doctrine. Indeed, one
of Valentine's majority Justices had second
thoughts seventeen years after the decision and
8 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
89 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
90 The Breard Court took notice of the intrusive
manner in which the magazines were being dissemi-
nated: "[I]t may be thought not really sporting to
corner the quarry in his home and through his open
door put pressure on the prospect to purchase....
[T]he exigencies of trade are not ordinarily expected
to have a higher rating constitutionally than the
tranquillity [sic] of the fireside .... 341 U.S. at 627.
91 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
92 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia




wrote: "The ruling was casual, almost offhand.
And it has not survived reflection. '93 In 1974,
four Justices wrote that "[T]here is some doubt
concerning whether the 'commercial speech'
distinction retains continuing validity."' But in
spite of the shaky foundation of broad, offhand
assumptions, the commercial speech doctrine
continues to exist and take on new meaning.
The Court's recent piecemeal extension of
"limited" constitutional protection to various
paid advertisements has reflected judicial reluc-
tance to totally abandon precedent, however
unprincipled. In New York Times v. Sullivan,
the Court carved out an "exception" to the
commercial speech "exception" by extending
free speech protection to a paid advertisement
which solicited monetary contributions. The
Court explained that the ad was not purely
commercial; rather, the Justices preferred to
consider it a political or "editorial" advertise-
ment which communicated information of pub-
lic interest and concern.9 5 Subsequently, in Bi-
gelow v. Virginia, the Court brought a commercial
advertisement within the scope of the first
amendment where the ad also contained factual
material of clear public interest." In Virginia
Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumers' Council,
the Court extended free speech protection to
commercial advertising containing nothing
particularly newsworthy, editorial, cultural,
philosophical or political.97 The Court ex-
plained that "no line between publicly 'interest-
ing' or 'important' commercial advertising and
93 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
I Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 376 U.S. 254, 265-66.
421 U.S. 809 (1975). Also see note 80 supra and
accompanying text. According to the Bigelow Court,
"Our cases, however, clearly establish that speech is
not stripped of First Amendment protection merely
because it appears in [advertisement] form." Id. at
818. However, "[a]dvertising, like all public expres-
sion, may be subject to reasonable regulation that
serves a legitimate public interest." Id. at 826. It is
the duty of the courts to balance the first amendment
interest against the public interest allegedly served
by the regulation. Id. The Bigelow Court noted that
its decision, resting on first amendment grounds,
was "in no way inconsistent with" the cases involving
regulation of professional activity and the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 825 n.10. For those fourteenth
amendment-professional regulation cases, see note
29 supra.
97 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
the opposite kind could ever be drawn.""8 Yet,
along with the Supreme Court's consistent ex-
pansion of free speech protection of advertis-
ing, the justices have warned that regulation of
commercial speech would still be tolerated 9
and that the first amendment would not fully
protect such speech.1 00
The current distinctions between commercial
and noncommercial speech rest not merely
upon dubious, offhand assumptions and
strained adherence to precedent. According to
Virginia Pharmacy and Bates, the distinctions are
also rooted in "commonsense."'' °
First, the Court's commonsense rationale
postulated that the commercial speaker may be
in a better position to verify information about
his product or service than a newsreporter or
political commentator would be.10 2 In reality,
however, it is not altogether clear that the
advertiser "can determine more readily than
others whether his speech is truthful and pro-
tected."103 The Court's unsupported declara-
tion suggests that the owner of a corner hard-
ware shop is in a better position to vouch for
representations concerning complicated elec-
tronic gagdets manufactured elsewhere, than
is a reliable and thorough investigative reporter
able to stand behind details of his reportorial
"product."
Second, the Court asserts that advertising as
an institution is sufficiently "durable" to with-
stand restraints which could chill other forms
of speech.' It apparently presumes that, in
the face of government restraint on commercial
speech, advertisers will take care of themselves.
"Since advertising is the sine qua non of com-
mercial profits," the Court reasons, "there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper
regulation and foregone entirely."'0 5 However,
even if advertising as an institution continues
to exist, it does not follow that the volume or
content of advertising will not be chilled. Any
restraint on commercial speech could certainly
98 Id. at 765.
9 See, e.g., Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., where the
Court said: "[W]e of course do not hold that it
[commercial speech] can never be regulated in any
way." Id. at 770.
100 See, e.g., Bates, 97 S. Ct. at 2708.
'01 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24; 97 S. Ct. at 2708.
102 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
'03 97 S. Ct. at 2707.




discourage an individual advertiser from enter-
ing the marketplace of commercial ideas; fur-
ther, the value of the commercial information
he selects for dissemination may be eroded by
any regulatory incentive for him to "play it
safe" with useless jingles or slogans.
The Court's assumptions concerning the du-
rability of advertising fail to provide any prin-
cipled basis for distinguishing protected from
unprotected speech. If durability of the insti-
tution or importance to the speaker are to be
tests of constitutional speech protection, much
vital editorial and political speech would neces-
sarily fall beyond the scope of first amendment
safeguards. For instance, a newspaper might
be sufficiently "durable" to stay in business
even after the imposition of government regu-
lation or censorship; yet there is no evidence to
suggest the Court believes that wholesale regu-
lation or censorship of newspapers would be
permissible, or that the mere ability to publish
safe, bland irrelevancies is all the first amend-
ment protects. Similarly, the Court does not
suggest that politicians enjoy less constitutional
speech protection than do ordinary individuals,
yet it is difficult to imagine statements more
important to their speaker's well-being than
statements of political candidates or public of-
ficials whose ability to influence public opinion
lies at the heart of their access to power.
The Court also referred to a third "common-
sense" distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, based on the proposi-
tion that the spontaneity of the former will not
be undesirably inhibited because its contents
are generally calculated. 10 However, the de-
gree to which one previously contemplated his
speech would seem to have little to do with
whether the first amendment should protect
its dissemination. If that were the case, care-
fully-prepared statements of one politician
would enjoy less constitutional protection than
the impulsive verbal "shots from the hip" of
another politician.
The result of the Court's "coimonsense"
distinction between commercial and noncom-
mercial speech is that the same information
could be subject to restraint when it appears
one day in an advertisement, and be fully
protected by the first amendment the following
day when it is picked up by a newspaper
'06 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
columnist. Such commonsense is, politely
speaking, nonsense.
However, the Court's "commonsense" dis-
tinctions serve a very practical, if' not princi-
pled, purpose. They allow the Court theoretical
room to permit continued regulation of adver-
tising where the first amendment might not
permit regulation of protected forms of speech.
But regulation does not necessarily require the
denial of full first amendment protection, since
"[t]he First and Fourteenth Amendments have
never been treated as absolutes. Freedom of
speech or press does not mean that one can
talk or distribute where, when and how one
chooses.""' 7 The Court could avoid the strain
of distinguishing commercial advertising from
noncommercial speech by extending first
amendment safeguards regardless of commer-
cial form. The Court could characterize the
protection of advertising as full but defeasible
upon a showing that strong countervailing in-
terests demand restraint. Instead of allocating
the first amendment protection on the basis of
an arbitrary speech category, the Court could
base free speech protection upon a balancing
of interests.'0 8 And since the Court's "common-
sense" considerations do not, in reality, support
the proposition that commercial speech is less
vulnerable to the chilling effects of regulation,
the first amendment overbreadth doctrine
should apply to commercial speech with full
force.
Conclusion
Now that the First Amendment has been
read to protect, in some fashion, an attorney's
advertisement, important issues concerning the
scope of that protection have been opened for
future litigation. Bates indicated that some reg-
107 Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642
(1951).
108 The balancing approach makes sense in light of
experience and established principle. For instance.
the first amendment will ordinarily protect a
speaker's criticism of another, until that protection is
defeased upon a showing of unprivileged defama-
tion; similarly, one may address a theater crowd with
full first amendment protection, but if the speaker
falsely shouts "fire" and causes panic, his utterances
will lose their protection. See, e.g., Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (dictumn). In these situa-
tions, the interest in free speech may be weaker than
the interest of an individual in his good name. or the
interest of society in avoiding disaster. It is suggested
that in all but the rare, compelling situation, the free
speech interest should prevail.
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ulation of attorney ads will be permitted in the
public interest, particularly with respect to
truthfulness, manner, time, place and the pos-
sibility of misleading consumers. Additionally,
the Court has indicated that the extent of
permissible regulation may depend at least
partly on who is doing the advertising. Indeed,
professionals may be among those subject to
stricter public interest standards than those
which are constitutionally applicable to ads of
nonprofessionals.' 09
However these issues are resolved, the new
qualified right of attorneys to advertise could
prompt some change in the practice and struc-
ture of the legal profession, potentially adding
new demand on legal services and judicial ma-
chinery, lowering fees for heavily-advertised
services through increased price competition,
and diminishing reliance on reputation and
log "[M]isstatements that might be overlooked or
deemed unimportant in other advertising may be
found quite inappropriate in legal advertising." 97 S.
Ct. at 2709.
110 Munford, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar Restraints
on Advertising and Solicitation of Attorneys, 62 VA. L.
REv. 1135, 1167 (1976): "This pressure would be
particularly strong in the market for standardized
services, the relative merits of which consumers can
more readily judge." It has beeii suggested that in
contacts by attorneys seeking to attract clients.
Ultimately-if attorney advertising does indeed
catch on-a new image of the legal profession
could be fostered."'
the absence of attorney advertising, it costs con-
sumers more to acquire information about attorneys
and, in some cases, reduced fee competition increases
the cost of ultimate services. Id. at 1168. Although it
would be foolhardy to attempt to predict with any
certainty the effects of advertising on the legal
profession, some tentative possibilities have been
suggested: Large law firms may be least affected by
the opportunity to advertise, to the extent that they
tend to offer less standardized services and have
wealthy individual and corporate clients who tend to
have more reliable information concerning the rela-
tive reputations of attorneys. Further, these clients
may benefit somewhat from the extent to which
absence of attorney advertising results in failure of
less-informed individuals to assert their legal rights.
And, it is said to be likely that large firms tend to
include larger numbers of attorneys committed to
the traditional self-image of the profession. These
factors could somewhat counteract the spectre of
large firms gaining increasing dominance because of
their ability to spend more on advertising; the result
of such a situation if pushed far enough could
provide large firms with a protected market position
and an ability to charge high, "monopolistic" prices.
Note, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Professional's Duty
to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L. J. 1181
(1972).
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